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supply yards, contractors' yards or lumber yards in residen-
tial districts must be liquidated, removed or discontinued
in a three year period.34
III. CONCLUSION
Non-conforming uses can and must be eliminated. It is
suggested that the amortization scheme, by balancing the
benefit gained by the public against the loss sustained by
the individual user, is the fairest method of achieving
this goal.
Substitution Of Judgment For Mentally Incompetent
In Re duPont'
The court-appointed guardians of the estate2 of Irene
duPont, an 86 year old mental incompetent of permanent
disability, applied to the court of chancery for authority
to make certain gifts from the corpus of the ward's estate
to the ward's children and grandchildren by way of an
inter-vivos trust. Evidence was introduced to show that
the requested transfer would provide the recipients with
a substantially greater benefit, through tax savings,3 than
if the assets were to pass under the ward's will and that
the incompetent, if sane, would have recognized the tax
advantages and made such a distribution. The issue facing
the court was whether the chancery court had the power
to authorize the guardians to execute an inter-vivos trust
on the basis of the probable wishes of the ward. The
court, in granting the guardian's application, found that
the broad scope of the Delaware Statute, conferring the
jurisdiction of the chancery court4 and the power of the
14 Zoning Ordinance of Cortlandt, New York, § 9 (1951). See also Zoning
Ordinance of Kansas City, Missouri, § 58-18 (1946), which provides that
signs and billboards must be liquidated within 5 years, and Ordinance No.
711 (1953), Shawnee County Zoning Plan (Kansas), which provides that
auto wrecking yards and the storing or locating of trailers are non-conform-
ing uses in residential districts and are to be removed within 2 years from
the effective date of the resolution.
I ... Del. Ch ... , 194 A. 2d 309 (1963).
2 The pronounced value of the estate was $176,000,000 which produced a
gross cash income of $5,800,000 and an after-tax annual income of $800,000.
The family would be benefited by a savings of approximately $16,100,000.
"12 DEL. CODE § 3914(d) (1962) provides: "In all matters relating to the
appointment, qualification, duties, powers, liability to account, and dis-
tribution of property at the recovery or death of the ward, such guardian
shall be governed by all of the applicable provisions of law and rules of
Court relating to the management of the estates of mentally ill persons."
12 DEL. CODE § 3701 (1962) provides: "The Court of Chancery shall have
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trustee5 over the estate of a mental incompetent, em-
powered the court to substitute its judgment for that of the
incompetent and do for him as he would probably have
done for himself.
The substitution of judgment doctrine was originally
announced in England in 1816 by Lord Eldon in Ex parte
Whitbread6 In authorizing certain payments to be made
from the surplus income of the estate of the incompetent
for the benefit of the incompetent's brothers and sisters
to whom he owed no legal obligation, but who were found
to be in need of support, the Chancellor said:
"[I]t is not because the parties are next of kin of the
Lunatic, or, as such, have any right to an allowance,
but because the Court will not refuse to do, for the
benefit of the Lunatic, that which it is probable the
Lunatic himself would have done."7
The Chancellor went on to say that the amount and pro-
portion of the allowance rests entirely within the discre-
tion of the court."
Subsequent English decisions have applied and, at times,
amplified the Whitbread principle.9 The indigence of the
recipient seems to have been a persuasive factor in many
of these cases.10 However, the English courts, in cases
lacking evidence of the recipient's need,' did not refuse a
petition for payments when the reasonable intent of the
incompetent was otherwise indicated. While almost all of
the care of mentally ill persons above the age of 21 years, so far as to
appoint trustees for such persons to take charge of them and manage
their estates."
'12 DEL. CODE § 3705 (1962) provides: "A trustee may, in the name of
the mentally ill person, do whatever is necessary for the care, preservation
and increase of his estate."
62 Mer. 99, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (Ch. 1816). But the original practice of
granting an allowance from the incompetent's estate to one whom he owed
no legal duty has been traced to the order of Lord Thurlow in the Matter
of Cotton, id. at 103, n. 1.
'Id. at 103; see Note, 17 Calif. L. Rev. 175 (1929), for a discussion of
the objective, strict subjective and liberal subjective standards used to
determine what the lunatic would himself do, in which the author con-
cludes that the objective standard is preferred although the court should
employ a judicious combination of the three tests in order to deal properly
with the diverse situations in this area of law.
8 See, e.g., In re Hudelson's Estate, 18 Cal. 2d 401, 115 P. 2d 805 (1941);
In re Brice's Guardianship, 233 Iowa 183, 8 N.W. 2d 576 (1943) ; In re
Buckley's Estate, 330 Mich. 102, 47 N.W. 2d 33 (1951).
1 See Note, The Surplus Income of a Lunatic, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 472 (1895),
for a lengthy consideration of the early English cases.
" See, e.g., Ex parte Whitbread, 2 Mer. 99, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (Ch. 1816);
In re Blair, 1 My. & Cr. 300, 40 Eng. Rep. 390 (Ch. 1836) ; In re Clarke,
2 Ph. 282, 41 Eng. Rep. 951 (Ch. D. 1847).
See In the Matter of Drummond, 1 My. & Cr. 627, 40 Eng. Rep. 516
(Ch. 1836).
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the cases indicate that the payments were to be made
from the surplus income of the estate, the court, in In re
Whitaker,12 allowed the funds to be taken from the corpus
of the estate. The doctrine was further extended to en-
compass beneficiaries not related by blood 18 and charitable
gifts;i  it was qualified so as to treat the allowance as an
advancement, 5 chargeable against the distributive share of
the recipient upon death of the incompetent. Despite the
amplification of the doctrine, the English courts have gen-
erally recommended that the substitution of judgment
practice "was one which could not be regarded with too
much caution, and the principle involved in it ought to be
narrowed rather than extended in its operation."'16
A small but growing number of American states have
adopted the substitution of judgment doctrine 17 and have
granted payments out of the estate of the incompetent to
persons to whom the incompetent owed no legal obliga-
tion. Initially the principal was accepted as being within
the purview of general equity jurisdiction. However, this
approach has been met with a barrage of criticism from
courts which have refused to accept the doctrine when it
was offered as resting upon equity jurisdiction alone.'
These courts have argued that at common law the care of
12 [1889] 42 Ch. D. 119. See also In re Brice's Guardianship, 233 Iowa 183,
8 N.W. 2d 576 (1943) ; In re Bond, 198 Misc. 256, 98 N.Y.S. 2d 81 (1950) ;
In re Fleming's Estate, 173 Misc. 851, 19 N.Y.S. 2d 234, 237 (1940). The
court said that in cases where the allowances are drawn out of the corpus
of the estate, the intent of the lunatic "must be made to appear . . . even
more clearly and convincingly than where there is surplus income
available .. "
11See In re Earl of Carysfort, 1 Cr. & Ph. 76, 41 Eng. Rep. 418 (Ch. D.
1840). Here an annuity was made for an old servant of the incompetent.
Cf. In re Evans, 21 Ch. D. 297 (1882). The court dispensed with the in-
gredient of intimacy or affection and granted an allowance to a cousin
whom, it appears, was not known by the lunatic.
"I See In re Strickland, L.R. 6 Ch. 225 (1871).
See In re Sparrow, 20 Ch. D. 320 (1882). The court, in granting an
allowance to the nephew, who was the heir-at-law of the lunatic and en-
titled to an entailed estate, barred the estate tail for the amount of the
allowance, in lieu of treating the allowance as an advancement. In re
Frost, L.R. 5 Ch. 699 (1870) ; In re Croft, [1862] 1 New Rep. 185. See also
In re Hudelson's Estate, 18 Cal. 2d 401, 115 P. 2d 805 (1941) ; 11 Paige's
Ch. Rep. 257 (N.Y. 1844). But see In re Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 181
App. Div. 642, 168 N.Y. Supp. 952 (1918), where an allowance was
treated as an absolute gift.
'5In re Blair, 1 My. & Cr. 300, 303, 40 Eng. Rep. 390 (Ch. 1836). See e.g.,
In re Hudelson's Estate, supra note 15.
17 See generally 160 A.L.R. 1435 (1946) ; 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons § 90
(1945) ; Note, supra note 7; Note, 14 Cornell L.Q. 89 (1928) ; Note,
supra note 9, Note, 2 Va. L. Rev. 204 (1914) ; 54 Harv. L. Rev. 143 (1940);
41 Harv. L. Rev. 402 (1928).
IsSee Kelly v. Scott, 215 Md. 530, 137 A. 2d 704 (1958) ; Binney v. Rhode
Island Hospital Trust Co., 43 R.I. 222, 110 AtI. 615 (1920) ; and Lewis v.
Moody, 149 Tenn. 687, 261 S.W. 673 (1923).
IN RE duPONT
incompetents was the King's prerogative, that this author-
ity passed to the state as parens patria and, consequently,
is not within the ambit of equity power, and therefore the
courts may apply the doctrine only after legislative dele-
gation. In response to this reasoning, the more recent
cases have only applied the doctrine when based upon a
statutory foundation.
The basis upon which the doctrine has been accepted
may be categorized into three classes: (1) the inherent
jurisdiction of equity over the person and property of the
insane, or (2) a liberal construction of a statute, which was
not enacted in terms of substitution of judgment, or (3)
a statute expressly vesting the court with this power.
New York, the first state to adopt the doctrine, 9 is illus-
trative of the implied or inherent power theory which
maintains that the equity court in inheriting all the power
and authority which the Court of Chancery formerly had,
is charged with the responsibility of protecting incompe-
tents. In the early New York cases, the Whitbread prin-
ciple was applied without statutory authority, while re-
cently it has been used notwithstanding the enactment of
a specific statute in the general area. 0 The New York courts
have given the doctrine its most extensive application'
only to be surpassed in breadth by duPont. Similarly, the
Court of Chancery of New Jersey first assumed the power
to give effect to the purpose of the ward as expressed
during his sanity22 and later continued to recognize the doc-
trine beyond the scope of a statute enacted in the area.28
Pennsylvania has also applied the doctrine without statu-
tory authority.24
The second category of states have employed a flexible
interpretation of statutory language which places with the
See In re Willoughby, 11 Paige's Ch. Rep. 257 (N.Y. 1844).
See In re Schley, 201 Misc. 522, 107 N.Y.S. 2d 884 (1951). The court,
finding that the lunatic's daughter-in-law was not a member of his "family"
within the meaning of the Civil Practice Act § 1357, which provides for
"the safe keeping and maintenance, and the edudation, when required, of
the incompetent person and his family," applied the substitution of judg-
ment principle in lieu of the statute.
See ibid; In re Fleming's Estate, 173 Misc. 851, 19 N.Y.S. 2d 234 (1940),
allowance taken out of the principal; In re Flagler, 130 Misc. Rep. 544,
224 N.Y. Supp. 27 (1926), incompetent's probable intention need not be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt; In re Heeney, 2 ,Barbour's Ch. Rep. 326(1847). Chancery has power to expend money from the lunatic's estate
for charitable and religious institutions not exceeding the amount that the
lunatic had been in the habit of giving.
'Potter v. Berry, 53 N.J. Eq. 151, 32 Atl. 259, 34 L.R.A. 297 (1895).
See In re Johnson, 11 N.J. Eq. 268, 162 Ati. 96 (1932). But see In re
Groebe, 49 N.J. Super. 111, 139 A. 2d 317 (1958) ; In re Roger's Estate,
96 N.J. Eq. 6, 125 Atl. 318 (1924).
21 See Hambleton's Appeal, 102 Pa. 50 (1883).
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court the responsibility for caring for the affairs of the
lunatic, and an application of equitable principles in the
exercise of this statutory jurisdiction to justify the use of
the substitution of judgment doctrine. For instance, in the
Michigan case, In Re Buckley's Estate, 5 the court found
that the lunatic's destitute brothers and sisters were mem-
bers of "his family"26 within the meaning of a statute which
directed the guardian to pay ". . . all expenses incurred
in the care, support or comfortable and suitable mainte-
nance of such ward, and his family if there be any, as may
be approved by the judge of probate."'27 The court, doing as
the insane "in all probability" would have done, allowed
payments to be made to them. In an Iowa case, In Re Brice's
Guardianship,2s the court found that the making of pay-
ments to the incompetent's destitute nephew fell within
the terms of an Iowa statute which provided that the
"Guardian... must prosecute and defend for their wards,
may employ counsel therefor, lease lands, loan money, and
in all other respects manage their affairs, under proper
orders of the court or a judge thereof. '29
The duPont case falls within this category. On the
basis of the statutory power30 placed with the court to
appoint trustees to manage, care, preserve and increase the
incompetent's estate, the guardians3' were permitted to do
as the lunatic would have done and make gifts to the
lunatic's children and grandchildren. Although the court
recognized "that the court should move with great caution
in this area," 32 it might be argued that the court's extensive
utilization of the doctrine comes dangerously close to
abuse. The American cases have indicated that the in-
25330 Mich. 102, 47 N.W. 2d 33 (1951).
2 For a liberal interpretation of the term "family," see In re Freeman's
Estate, 171 Miss. 147, 157 So. 253 (1934) ; Seley v. Howell, 115 Tex. 583,
28-5 S.W. 815 (1926).
o7 MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (217) (Cum. Supp. 1949).
28In re Brice's Guardianship, 233 Iowa 183, 8 N.W. 2d 576 (1943).
2'IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.9 (1939) (emphasis added).
0 See statutes cited notes 4 & 5 supra.3 The court-appointed guardians were Irenee duPont, Jr. and Crawford
H. Greenewalt. See generally 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons § 42 (1945), which
maintains that the court may appoint any proper person, including rela-
tives, as a guardian of a mental incompetent. Of. Tate v. Tate, 190 Tenn.
39, 227 S.W. 2d 50, 52 (1950). The court, refusing the petition of the
guardian of the incompetent, who was also the sister, seeking funds for
her own support, said:
"The policy of the law so to separate the interests of trustees and
beneficiaries as to leave no room for casuistry and the least possible
temptation for divided allegiance, is so general and so salutary that a
legislative purpose to depart from it will not be presumed in the
absence of positive expression or unambiguous implication."
... Del. Ch ... , 194 A. 2d 309, 317 (1963) ; accord, note 16 supra.
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digence of the recipient is a decisive factor,33 yet in duPont
there was certainly "no problem of need." Furthermore,
it is amply clear that the underlying purpose of the guard-
ian's petition was tax avoidance.34 Nevertheless, the court
aided the petitioner's anomalous objective by allowing them
to employ the Whitbread doctrine as the vehicle to escape
the tax collector. Also, the court's firm approval of the
withdrawal of the gift from the principal of the estate35
was an action rarely taken by even the most liberal juris-
dictions. These considerations tend to indicate that the
Delaware court has subjected the doctrine to its most
strained application.
The third class of states have, by statute, expressly
authorized their courts to substitute the court's judgment
for that of the ward. This approach accommodates the
interests of judicial flexibility with the desirability of
statutory safeguards which prevent an abuse of judicial
discretion. For instance, the California court in In Re
Hudelson's Estate,36 claimed that its treatment of a monthly
allowance to the incompetent's adult daughter as an ad-
vancement on her inheritance was a proper exercise of
the discretion vested in the court by a California statute
which provides:
"On the application of the guardian or next of kin of
an insane or incompetent person, the court may direct
the guardian to pay and distribute surplus income, not
used for the support and maintenance of the ward, or
any part of such surplus income, to the next of kin
whom the ward would, in the judgment of the court,
have aided, if such ward had been of sound mind. The
granting of such allowance and the amounts and pro-
portions thereof shall be discretionary in the court, but
the court shall give consideration to the ... amount
which the ward would, in the judgment of the court,
have allowed said next of kin, had said ward been of
sound mind.""7
18See e.g., In re Brice's Guardianship, 233 Iowa 183, 8 N.W. 2d 576
(1943) ; In re 'Buckley's Estate, 330 Mich. 102, 47 N.W. 2d 33 (1951) ; In re
Fleming's Estate, 173 Misc. 851, 19 N.Y.S. 2d 234 (1940). The relative's
need is an important factor in determining whether the incompetent, if
sane, would have made the payment. See Note, supra note 7. The author
contends that before the court will consider the application, it must be
shown that the beneficiary is reliant upon the incompetent for support.
"But see 'Bulloch Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. & Co. R. 2d 682 (1957).
a Compare In re Fleming's Estate, 173 Misc. 851, 19 N.Y.S. 2d 234 (1940),
with In re -Schwartz, 27 Del. Ch. 223, 34 A. 2d 275 (1943).
18 CaL 2d 401, 115 P. 2d 805 (1941).
CAIFOaNIA PROBATE CoDE § 1558 (1956).
1964]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIV
This statute, in permitting the court to exercise the doc-
trine, specifies the boundaries - kinship and surplus in-
come - beyond which the court may not stray.
The only Maryland case which discusses the Whitbread
principle is Kelly v. Scott.88 The Kelly court rejected the
doctrine, reversing an order of the Circuit Court of Balti-
more County which had granted to the incompetent's in-
fant granddaughter, who was neither a member of the in-
competent's household nor dependent upon him, the sum
of $125 a month for her maintenance and support. The
court declared that it had no inherent jurisdiction89 to
make an allowance from the estate of an adjudicated in-
competent, and that its statutory authority" was limited to
payments made either for the benefit of persons within the
incompetent's household4' or for the "support and mainte-
nance of the incompetent's dependents."42 But the court
concluded by saying:
"No doubt, there is force in the suggestion that the
equity courts in Maryland ought to have power to deal
with the disposal of the surplus income of an incompe-
tent, comparable to that exercised by the courts in
other jurisdictions, particularly in hardship cases. But
we think that is a problem for the Legislature."4
215 Md. 530, 137 A. 2d 704 (1958).
The court argued that the English Court of Chancery had no inherent
Jurisdiction over the person and property of an incompetent, as this power
resided in the King as an executive prerogative on the theory of parens
patriae and was delegated to the Lord Chancellor as the King's repre-
sentative by means of an official instrument called the "Sign Manual."
10 The statutory authority of courts of equity in Maryland to take charge
of the estates of persons adjudicated non compos mentis is derived from
the Act of 1785, ch. 72, § 6 which provided, "The court shall have full
power and authority in all cases, to superintend and direct the affairs of
persons non compos mentis, both as to care of their persons and the man-
agement of their estates, and may appoint a committee, or a trustee or
trustees for such persons, and may make such orders and decrees respect-
ing their persons and estates as to the court may seem proper." MD. CODE
Art. 16, § 132 (1957).
" Maryland under the Declaration of Rights, Art. 5, has adopted the
Statute, De Praerogativa Regis, 17 Edw. 2 (1326), which provided that
the lands and tenements of lunatics should be "safely kept without Waste
and Destruction, and that they and their Households shall live and be
maintained competently with the Profits of the same." See Matter of
Easton, 214 Md. 176, 133 A. 2d 441 (1957). The court relates the develop-
ment of this area of law in Maryland.
"The scope of the equity court's jurisdiction was broadened by legisla-
tion in 1929 which provided, in part, that: "The committee or trustee shall
care for and manage the property of the incompetent and, may upon proper
order of the court expend cash for the incompetent's support and mainte-
nance, as well as for the support and maintenance of the incompetent's
dependents." M. CODE (1957) Art. 16, § 135 (Cum Supp. 1963) (emphasis
added).
" Kelly v. Scott, 215 Md. 530, 537, 137 A. 2d 704 (1958).
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The effect of the Kelly decision has been "modified
by subsequent legislation 44 (Art. 16, Sec. 135A) which,
prompted by the suggestion of the Kelly court provides:
"The court in its discretion ... may allow, upon the
application of any guardian, committee or trustee of
an incompetent's estate, where there is a surplus of
income in the comnittee or trust estate, and where a
hardship case exists additional payments of support
and maintenance. Such payments may be made to such
person, or persons as the incompetent would reason-
ably have been expected to make had he been in a
sound state of mind and capable of managing his
affairs. '45
An emphasis of the terms "additional" (modifying "pay-
ments") and "such" (modifying "person or persons") might
lead one to construe this statute as relating directly to an
earlier enactment, Art. 16, Sec. 135,40 which allows the
trustee, upon order of the court, to make payments "for the
support and maintenance of the incompetent's depend-
ents." Such an interpretation would limit Sec. 135A to
additional payments made in hardship cases to incompe-
tent's dependents, only. This position is untenable and
would render Sec. 135A superfluous, since at the time of its
passage any payment to a dependent was already ade-
quately covered by Sec. 135. A proper construction would
not restrictively interpret "person or person's" as meaning
dependents but would allow payments to be made to any
person to whom the incompetent would have made such
payments.
It appears then that the legislature has placed Mary-
land among those whose courts are explicitly vested with
the power to apply the substitution of judgment doc-
trine. However, it should be noted that this delegation
is restricted to recipients who could be classified as
"hardship cases," and to payments which could be with-
drawn from "surplus income." Petitions for payments from
an incompetent's estate, which base their claim upon the
substitutional judgment doctrine but fail to conform to
these statutory requirements and which fail to come with-
in the statutory province of either dependency 47 or house-
hold membership, 48 will be governed by the Kelly decision
" Scott v. First National Bank, 224 Md. 462, 464, 168 A. 2d 349 (1961).
" MD. CODE (1957) Art. 16, § 135A (Cum. Supp. 1963).
" Supra note 42.
'7 Ibid.
"Supra note 42.
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and therefore will be denied. Thus, notwithstanding this
statute, the essence of Kelly - that the court's power to
grant payments from the estate of an incompetent is de-
pendent upon statutory delegation - remains. Clearly
then, a petition such as duPont, which is not within the
ambit of the statutory delegation of the power to apply
the substitution of judgment principal, would be rejected
by the Maryland courts.
In conclusion, the Whitbread principle provides the
court with the necessary latitude to deal fairly with the
estate of an incompetent. It is hoped that its increasing
acceptance, by either statutory or judicial adoption in the
American jurisdictions, will be coupled with a prudent
application, responsive both to the ward's probable wishes
and to those that have a bona fide claim in his estate.
STANLEY G. MAZAROFF
Sovereign Immunity Of Foreign Merchant Vessels
Flota Maritima Browning v. Motor Vessel Ciudad'
In a libel in rem against the vessel Ciudad de la Habana,
the libellant sought damages for the alleged breach of two
lease-purchase agreements. Prior to filing his suit, libellant
had notified the owner-lessor, a Cuban corporation, of the
alleged breaches and disclaimed any future responsibility
under the contracts. Thereafter, on June 5, 1959, the vessel
was sold to the Republic of Cuba, and the shipping agent
who was in control of the vessel was notified by the Cuban
corporation that he was henceforth to act as agent for the
Cuban government.2 On June 22, 1959 the libel was brought
and the vessel was seized pursuant to that libel. On Octo-
ber 27, 1960 the Republic of Cuba entered its appearance
in the case, claimed ownership of the vessel, prayed to
defend and filed an answer but failed to raise the defense
of sovereign immunity. In fact, a plea of sovereign im-
munity was not filed until May 11, 1962.' In refusing to
1 The Daily Record, August 24, 1964, p. 2 (4th Cir. 1964).
'Ibid. The recognition and acceptance of Cuba's right of control and
ownership by the agent who was in control of the ship at the time it was
libelled was undoubtedly considered to be sufficient control under the rule
of the Navemar case, which required "actual possession by some act of
physical dominion or control in behalf of the Spanish Government . . . or
at least some recognition . . . that they were controlling the vessel and
crew in behalf of their government." (Emphasis added.) Compania
Espanola v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 75-76 (1938). See generally, infra
note 26 for cases applying this rule.
I The Daily Record, August 24, 1964, p. 2 (4th Cir. 1964). The State
Department made no suggestion with respect to sovereign immunity,
although requested to do so by representatives of the Republic of Cuba.
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